One of the main concerns of the companies currently is as its action will be interpreted by the market, that is, the type of signalling that is being passed for the external Agents, for example, through the politics of shares and structure of capital. For Rasmusen (1992) signalling is a form used for an Agent to communicate its type or quality for another Agent, under influence of the problem of adverse election. Kirmani and Rao (2000) consider signals the actions taken for one of the parts of a transaction to disclose to its type or true qualifications.

The signalling of the quality can be carried through in some ways as marks, reputation in the market, practised price and expenses with propaganda. As Gravy (1997) exists two versions for signalling: in the version standard, the informed part initiates a sequence of events, for example, in the case of the work market, the worker chooses data education level and the employer answers with one definitive one offers of wage. In the alternative version, the uninformed part initiates the sequence of events, for example, employers offer to the workers some types of contract (that he specifies which wage for each level of education of the employee) and the workers will answer choosing the preferred contract. Male and the Perez-Castilho (1997) make mention to the example of the financial market and as the signalling functions in two levels: for a manager who knows the value of its firm and wants to order a signal for the market (aiming at, for example to increase its capital just receiving a price in the emission from the actions) and for the market, a signal concrete is ‘ health financeira’ ‘ of the firm, what it stimulates the manager of this to keep the indebtedness in low levels. Spence (1974) remembers that the salesmen of durable goods they emit signals for the consumers regarding its products to create a favorable impression or, more necessarily to reach the probabilist beliefs on the quality of its products.